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Abstract
Church’s hypothesis and Godel’s theorem may provide constraints on mental processes.As a relief
quantum entanglement may lead to a definite proposal as regards the nature of reality and how
much of it we are able to know and how do we know it.We deal with these questions and have
devised a Gedanken Experiment showing the redundancy of principle of reality. We thereby propose a
model describing the processes of making conclusions from a given set of premises though without the
reference of neurobiological processes at present.We argue thereafter that the physical laws of nature
may not be universal as it seems, being dependent on some physical processes namely computation
and the states of neural cognitive states which may be governed yet by some other rule.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to investigate in general terms the observed phenomena,nature
of reality and the way we reach conclusions from a set of premises.For the development of
any scientific discovery the initial set of patterns account for most of the observations and
experiments which are fundamental to its realizations.Furthur development can be achieved by
the construction of elaborate equipment,techniques,esoteric vocabulary and skills. The scientific
method encompasses both the mathematical and empirical sciences, and we briefly discuss why
it is necessity that drives science and determines what we mean by the scientific method. By
necessity we mean laws of nature and of human thought that scientific theories have to try and
explain. By the statement that science is driven by necessity, we mean that the discipline of
science as such addresses aspects of reality that are governed by necessity. Scientific research is
open ended and exploratory, and finding new and unexplained phenomena is the main objective.
Mathematical sciences - which include mathematics, computer science, simulations and so on -
consist of purely symbolic structures that are freely produced by the human mind. Of course
all of language consists of signs and words as well, in that the word is not a thing but can only
signify to what it represents. A mathematical theorem necessarily follows from the axioms of the
subject. It does not depend on the subjectivity of any mathematician, since all mathematicians
will be able to reproduce the same (universal) result. Evidence in mathematics consists of the
derivation of the result. There are instances when there are plausible theorems for which no such
evidence is available, and such theorems are called conjectures. Only when a proof is offered
is the matter resolved. Mathematics is that component of human thought that is entirely and
completely determined by necessity. Mathematical theorems are unconditionally valid - in all
circumstances and for all time. Empirical sciences - which include physics, chemistry, biology,
astronomy, geology and so on - are theories and explanations of nature based on empirical
verification. Such verification entails producing evidence - for or against the theory - in the
form of data which is presented to sense perception, and is external to the mind. Scientific data
cannot be something that is produced by the human mind. Once empirical evidence - namely,
data - has been procured, the mind can then analyze such data to interpret, verify or falsify
various scientific theories.
The methodology of science, it’s so called mode of inquiry, is determined by necessity.The
most powerful aspect of the sciences is its ability to predict how nature will behave in the future,
or in new and unknown circumstances. Technology is rooted on devices and instruments that
are made based on scientific principles, which can then successfully manipulate nature. Science
can even predict the existence of phenomena that were hitherto unknown. For example, the
mathematics of quantum physics predicted in 1929 [1] that an electron would have an anti-
particle as its counterpart. Anti-particles had never even been thought of until then, let alone
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having been detected. And sure enough, when guided by this theoretical prediction, anti-
electrons were experimentally found in 1935. There are numerous such examples in science.
The question naturally arises, are there mathematical structures essential for theory that do
not have any measurable manifestation? Richard Feynman has the following to say. “It is not
true that we can pursue science completely by using only those concepts which are directly
subject to experiment. In quantum mechanics itself there is a probability amplitude, there
is a potential, and there are many constructs that we cannot directly measure.”[2] Are there
theoretical constructs in physical theories that have absolutely no physical consequence, but
are nevertheless required by the mathematical structure of the theory? One can only make
some conjectures. In quantum mechanics, the answer to this question, in principle, seems to be
yes. The predictive power of science is completely based on the universality and “objectivity”
of mathematics. The result of mathematical calculations yield new symbols and structures
that are then identified, by a leap of imagination, with physical objects and processes. As we
proceed we will be tackling in detail the terms ”imagination” etc. The route essentially depends
on a suitable process of computation.[3] So as a whole we see if we can link the discovery of
physical theories to be synthetic truths, then the process of computation may be the crucial
component for the theory of knowledge.
As it can very well be understood that at this stage of development the analysis will be
mainly speculative and we will be considering a mechanism from a purely kinematical point of
view. The question merely rests on the age old question raised by Kant as to the efficacy of
pure mathematics and its methodology. The answer by pure empiricists that our mathematical
knowledge is derived by induction from particular instances seems to be inadequate as the
validity of of the inductive hypothesis itself cannot be proved by induction. As we all would
possibly agree that mathematical knowledge is general. It seems strange that that we should
be able to know some truths in advance about particular things of which we yet have no
experience. Again the observable world around us which are in general our experiences based
on perceptions which gives rise to knowledge which is particular. But the amazing fact which has
remained is that the application of mathematics to the observable world has produced general
statements regarding it. We are avoiding at present more general questions regarding the status
of statements and their relation to the world of universals. Now it is a obvious observation as
we have already stated that the scientific theories do heavily rely on mathematics.The mode of
operation of mathematics and its progress has been on the other hand entirely dependent on
the process of computation.
At this point we are led into several viewpoints as regards its functionality. The so called
proponents of strong AI [4] which claim that any sort of thinking is computation. Apart from
dealing with the questions of awareness and consciousness which we don’t intend to address at
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present (we would mention some of its implication on our theory in the conclusions 3) we have
a feeling that essentially any conceivable idea of reaching conclusions is apparently through a
set of rules and methods which is essentially a computation. Though as has been proposed by
Penrose [6] that appropriate physical action of the brain may not be simulated computationally.
We are not yet sure about the proposal yet, the Godel [7] Turing arguments as regards the
incompleteness of mathematical reasoning does’not quite guarantee that some sort of process
which is completely non computational may make it complete.May be incompleteness is the
truth itself. Penrose’s hypothesis regarding quantum gravity making a route to solve the riddles
seems an attractive proposal nonetheless seems to be driven by a sole motivation to bind the
nature into a single whole.
One of the important aspects of scientific research is to ask reasonable questions. In the con-
text of analysing physical theories the fundamental objects under scrutiny is the meausurement
procedure and algorithm themselves. So as a matter of fact whether some computational pro-
cess is stoppable or not as has been advocated in [8] is mainly a technical problem. Analysing
meausurement processes immediately leads us to the world of quantum mechanics. As we all
know the paths of quantum mechanics tries to see nature in terms of of the observer and the ob-
served the construction of physical theories is inevitably linked to both the segments as we will
look in due course. The next object under analysis is the corresponding computational process
and algorithms. Surprisingly devising algorithms will bear new fruits rather than generating
them.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the Church’s Thesis and Godel
Turing arguments applied to the mental processes. In Section 3 we will discuss a short review of
Quantum entanglement and the basic idea which we will require in the last section-the central
theme of the paper. Section 4 deals in devising a Gedanken Experiment demonstrating nature
of reality and it’s relation to our Observed world. The last section is concerned with a proposal
of a model as regards the description of the physical universe and the way we reach various
conclusions, which in turn give rise to physical theories.
2 Church Turing hypothesis & Godel’s Theorem
Whenever we are into the arena of discussing theories of processing information we are inevitably
led to discuss Church’s thesis.We mainly follow [9],[10].
3A good reference for all these ideas may be in [5]
3
2.1 Church’s Thesis :
(a) A function f is semicomputable iff it is partial recursive.
(b) A function f is computable 4iff both f and χD(f)
5 are partial recursive.
Definition :
(a) A sequence of partial functions f1, f2....fnis called partial recursive description of the func-
tion fN = f
if


f1, belongs to family of basic functions;
fi, i ≥ 2 either belong to family of basic functions or obtained by recursion


(b) A function is called partial recursive if it admits a partial recursive description.
Church’s thesis is used for a definition of algorithmic undecidability. Suppose we have a
countable sequence of mathematical problems P1, P2...... Furthermore suppose that such a
problem has a yes or no answer and that the conditions on Pn are written effectively as a
function of n. We associate to such a problem a mapping,
f : Z+ −→ Z+
D(f) = {i ∈ Z+ | Pi has yes for an answer }
f(i) = 1 if i ∈ D(f)
The problem P is called algorithmically decidable if the functions f and χD(f) are partial
recursive. Otherwise P is called algorithmically undecidable. Church’s thesis alows us to solve
such equations in two stages: (1) finding an informal solution using any intuitive algorithms
we need. (2) formalising the solution. The Church-Turing thesis concerns the notion of an
effective or mechanical method in logic and mathematics. A method, or procedure, M, for
achieving some desired result is called effective or mechanical just in case M is set out in terms
of a finite number of exact instructions,M will, if carried out without error, produce the desired
result in a finite number of steps; M can be carried out by a human being unaided by any
machinery. M demands no insight or ingenuity on the part of the human being carrying it out.
Statements that there is an effective method for achieving such-and-such a result are commonly
expressed by saying that there is an effective method for obtaining the values of such-and-such a
4x ∈ Z+
m
as input gives f(x) as output if x ∈ D(f) or 0 otherwise. Computational functions are semi
computable
5Characteristic function of X ⊂ Y ⇒χX : Y → Z
+ s.t χX(x) = 1 if x ∈ X and 2 otherwise.
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mathematical function. For example, that there is an effective method for determining whether
or not any given formula of the propositional calculus is a tautology e.g. the truth table
method is expressed in function-speak by saying that there is an effective method for obtaining
the values of a function, call it T, whose domain is the set of formulae of the propositional
calculus and whose value for any given formula x, written T(x), is 1 or 0 according to whether
x is, or is not, a tautology.
2.2 Turing’s Hypothesis :
The notion of an effective method is an informal one, and attempts to characterise effectiveness,
such as the above, lack rigour, for the key requirement that the method demand no insight or
ingenuity is left unexplicated. One of Turing’s achievements in his paper of 1936 [11] was to
present a formally exact predicate with which the informal predicate can be calculated by means
of an effective method may be replaced. Church did the same (1936a)[12] . The replacement
predicates that Turing and Church proposed were, on the face of it, very different from one
another, but they turned out to be equivalent, in the sense that each picks out the same set of
mathematical functions. The Church-Turing thesis is the assertion that this set contains every
function whose values can be obtained by a method satisfying the above conditions.
The formal concept proposed by Turing is that of computability by Turing machine. He
argued that whenever there is an effective method for obtaining the values of a mathematical
function, the function can be computed by a Turing machine. The converse claim is easily es-
tablished, for a Turing machine program is itself a specification of an effective method: without
exercising any ingenuity or insight, a human being can work through the instructions in the
program and carry out the required operations. If Turing’s thesis is correct, then talk about
the existence and non-existence of effective methods can be replaced throughout mathematics
and logic by talk about the existence or non-existence of Turing machine programs.
2.3 Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem :
Let T ⊂ S(A) be the set of true expressions where A is the finite or countable alphabet and let
S(A) be the set of expressions in A. D⊂ S(A) is the set of provable or deducible expressions.
The incompleteness principles of Godel are enumerated as follows: (i) The set D is enumerable.
(ii) The set T is not enumerable if the semantics of truth is rich enough to include elementary
arithmetic.
So as we see Godel’s Theorem can be succinctly be stated as:
All formal theories of mathematics satisfy the above incomplete principles of (i) & (ii). There-
fore if a theory be sufficiently rich, it always contains true expressions which are not provable.
The above methodology may be now turned on to see how the process may be applied to
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mental processes. The conclusion of Godel’s argument implies that there are allowed brain
process P that can never stop in spite of the fact that no system operating according to the
rules by which the brain operates could ever reach the conclusion that P can never stop. As a
matter of fact that there exists a k such that C(k, k) stops iff C(k, k) can never stop is knowable
cannot be proved within the fintistic type of model described above.The finite type computer X
which can in principle simulate the mechanical activity of the human brain can be imbedded in
a computer Y whose rules of operation included implementation of the concept for ∀’n’, and to
which the Godel/Turing argument can be applied. Then the mind M that could comprehend
both the rules of operation of C and also the logic of the Godel/Turing proof would be able
to compute a value k such that the proposition that ”C(k, k) stops iff C(k, k) can never stop
is knowable”,where knowable means information by virtue of the outputs of Y. The mind M
knows that Pk is true can know also that X is knowable entails that X is true,and can therefore
conclude that C(k, k) can never stop. Thus M can know more than what is knowable. This
is the analog of Godel’s theorem and is not a contradiction. On the other hand the human
mathematician can know only the output of X. He will be able to reason on the basis of what
hypothetical, M is able to know, that there exists some k, such that C(k, k) can never stop.
However it has not been proved that the only way that he could know this is by virtue of the
stopping of C(k, k). The stopping of C(k, k) may be the unique process which gives the strong
result that C(k, k) can never stop is knowable.
3 Quantum Entanglement, A Short review:
One of the key issue in the foundations of quantum mechanics for all these years has been
the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument [13] regarding the incompleteness of a quantum theory
though mainly the Copenhagen interpretation.The basic argument can be stated as
Every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physical theory
The proposal has been analysed from various contexts and the notable among them been the
Bohmian mechanics,[14] Bell’s Theorem [15] and Gleason’s Theorem [16]. We will not go into
the details here but mainly discuss the most notable feature which the argument has led us
into, the idea of Quantum Entanglement. As we will see in Section 5 our main construction is
very much related to the argument and the idea of entangled states. Our discussion mainly is
on the same lines with [17]
A simple description of the essential non-classical nature of quantum entanglement is given
in Entangled Choices. For a more detailed and technical analysis, consider the quantum spin of
an electron (or any spin-1/2 particle), which is always found to have either the value +h/2 or
-h/2 in the direction of measurement, regardless of the direction we choose to measure. Thus
an electron manifests one of only two possible spin states, which we may call spin up and
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spin down. It’s convenient to represent these states as orthogonal unit vectors In general an
electron’s spin state, Y, at any instant can be represented by a linear combination of those two
possible observable states. The choice of a measurement direction is equivalent to choosing a
basis for expressing the spin components of the state Y. For any particular basis we can express
the state in the form
|Ψ〉 = c1|+〉+ c2|−〉
where c1and c2 are complex constants. These constants encode the probability that the cho-
sen measurement will yield either result. The probability is simply the norm of the respective
coefficient.We have
c⋆1c1 + c
⋆
2c2 = 1
In quantum mechanics, each possible measurement basis is associated with an operator
whose eigenvalues are the possible results of the respective measurement. For a given xyz basis
of orthogonal space coordinates we can represent the three principle measurements (i.e., mea-
surements along the three axes) by the Pauli spin matrices σx, σy, σz. The eigenvalues of the
measurement operator corresponding to whichever measurement direction we choose determine
the coefficients c1 and c2, which represent the probabilities of the possible outcomes. To see
how this works, suppose |θ〉 is the initial state vector of the electron, and we decide to perform
a spin measurement corresponding to a particular operator . The result is given by applying
to |θ〉, using ordinary matrix multiplication, to give the new state vector |β〉 as shown below:
U|θ〉 = |β〉
If |β〉 is either pure spin up or pure spin down(basis states) in the direction of measurement
represented by , it follows that a subsequent measurement in the same direction must yield the
same result, so |β〉 must be such that
U|β〉 = q|β〉
for some constant q(since state vectors are equivalent up to length). Thus the constant q is
an eigenvalue of the measurement operator,and |β〉is the corresponding eigen-vector.
Since the arbitrary initial state |θ〉is not in general an eigenvector of U, it can yield either of
the eigenvectors of the basis states. This reveals the probabilistic aspect of quantum mechanics.
The eigenvectors constitute a basis for the space of possible state vectors, so |θ〉can be ex-
pressed as a linear combination of those eigenvectors. If we let |β〉 & |δ〉 denote the eigenvectors,
then we can express |θ〉as
7
c1|β〉+ c2|δ〉 = |θ〉
Again, the norm of each complex coefficient gives the probability that applied to |θ〉 will
lead to the respective eigenstate.
The same analysis can be extended to three or more principle direction spin operators as
presented above. Each pair of eigenvectors constitutes a basis for the state space, so we can
express the electron’s state vector as a linear combination of the basis vectors for the desired
measurement, and the coefficients give the probability of that measurement yielding either spin
up or spin down. We can think of these probabilities as the projections of the initial state vector
onto the orthogonal axes of the chosen measurement basis. Of course, we aren’t restricted to
measurements along one of the principle axes. We can measure the spin of the electron along
any spatial axis, and each such measurement is represented by an operator. We also note that
these directions are purely relative to the state of the particle in question.
These quantum mechanical predictions have some remarkable implications. An experiment
can be performed by examining the spins of two spin-1/2 particles emitted in opposite directions
from the decay of a singlet state with zero total spin. In such a case conservation of angular
momentum requires that the spin state vectors of the individual particles are precisely opposite,
so if we measure the spin of one of these particles along a certain direction and find spin up in
that direction, then the other particle must have pure spin down in that direction. Thus, by
measuring the spin of one particle and reducing its state vector to one of the eigenvectors of
the chosen measurement basis, we automatically collapse the wavefunction of the other particle
onto this same basis.
At first sight this process may not seem very mysterious, since it’s easy to imagine that
the two coupled particles are programmed with opposite spins, such that they will always give
opposite results when measured along any given direction. However, a detailed analysis of the
quantum mechanical predictions for all possible combinations of measurement angles reveals
the need for a profound change in the classical view of the world.
If the measurement of one particle along a fixed direction (in the xz plane) yields spin
down, then the other particle is purely spin up in that direction. Consequently if we perform a
measurement on the other particle along a direction at an angle of α from the first measurement,
we will see that the probability of spin up is 1
2
cos(α/2) and the probability of spin down in
1
2
sin(α/2). In a similar way we can show that if the measurement of the first particle yields
spin up, then the other particle is purely spin down along that direction, and a measurement
of that other particle along a direction at an angle α relative to the first will yield spin up with
probability 1
2
sin(α/2)and spin down with probability 1
2
cos(α/2).
Hence the probability that the measurements of these two particles at angles differing by α
will both give the same result (both up or both down) is 1
2
sin(α/2) , and the probability that
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they will yield opposite results (one up and one down) is 1
2
cos(α/2) . The angle αbetween the
two measurements can be expressed as x - y where x is the angle of the measurement performed
on one of the particles and y is the angle of the measurement performed on the other. The two
particles emitted from a singlet state are said to be entangled, because regardless of how far
apart they travel before the spin measurements are made, the joint results will exhibit these
joint probabilities.
From a classical standpoint we would imagine that each particle emerges from the singlet
state with, in effect, a set of programmed instructions for what spin to exhibit at each possible
angle of measurement, or at least what the probability of each result should be. The usual
approach to analyzing these phenomena classically is to stipulate that a particle’s programmed
instructions for responding to a measurement at a given angle must be definite and unambigu-
ous (rather than probabilistic) because we classically regard the two measurement angles as
independent, which implies that the measurement on the other particle could be at the same
angle as our measurement of this particle, and the particles must give opposite results in that
case. Likewise the measurement on the other particle could be 180 degrees away from our mea-
surement of this particle, and the particles must give equal results in that case. Of course, the
individual measurements can each be either spin up or spin down in both of these cases, so in
principle they could still be probabilistic tendencies, but classically we have no way of ensuring
perfect correlation (or perfect anti-correlation) of the joint results of spacelike separated events
other than by definitely programming the spins of each particle for each possible measurement
angle.
From this assumption it follows that the instructions to one particle are just an inverted
copy of the instructions to the coupled particle. In other words, for each measurement angle
from 0 to 2p the programmed response to a spin measurement for one particle is the opposite
of the programmed response of the other particle at that angle. Furthermore, since we have
perfect correlation if our measurements are at angles that differ by 180 degrees, it follows that
the programmed instructions for each particle are individually anti-symmetric at a phase angle
of 180 degrees. For example, if a particle’s programmed response for a measurement at angle a
is spin up, then the programmed response of that same particle for a measurement at angle x
+ p must be spin down. Hence we can fully specify the instructions to both particles by simply
specifying the instructions to one of the particles for measurement angles ranging from 0 to p .
For the sake of completeness it will be worthwhile to state in brief some of the resolutions
of the problem. Numerous discussions of quantum entanglement discuss hidden variables,[18]
[19]and they derive inequalities involving the correlations as functions of these so called vari-
ables. In a sense, these variables are redundant, because the essence of the so-called local
realistic premise is that each particle emerges from the singlet state with definite instructions
for the spin it will exhibit for each possible measurement angle. This implies that the only
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relevant free variable is the reference orientation, since the instruction profile can be oriented in
any direction relative to the measurements with uniformly distributed probability. Integrating
the product of spins over the entire angular range with a fixed difference angle must yield the
correlation of the two spin measurements.
It might be argued that we need not assume any single particle exhibits the quantum me-
chanical probabilities, because these probabilities can only be evaluated by performing multiple
measurements, so we might imagine that it’s necessary to evaluate the results over a sequence of
particle pairs, rather than just a single pair. Moreover, we might think that this sequence could
possess memory,[20] making the results of successive pairs dependent. However, in principle a
large number of particle pairs can be prepared in an identical way, in spacelike-separated loca-
tions, and perform measurements on the pairs independently. According to quantum mechanics
we would still expect the combined results to satisfy the same correlations. This implies that
each particle pair must embody the overall propensities that we expect to find manifested in
multiple trials.
4 A Gedanken Experiment
Figure 1: Observed & Real Worlds
The figures depicted above is a diagram for the simple thought experiment which we de-
scribe below.In both Fig A and Fig B Part Y are identical,as shown enclosed within a dashed
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box are to be taken inaccessible to any observer which we term as reality in a sense that the
phenomena of the observable part X and X’ of world will be dependent on them.So X & X’are
the only parts which the observers are aware of. So part Y of both the diagrams do not exist
in relation to the observer. The experiment is designed as follows.
Let us first describe Part Y of the diagrams. As we have stated earlier part Y is a hypothetical
entity which are non existent to any observer. It consists of an enclosure which contain two
massive balls, which may move or collide in the enclosure producing observable effects on part
X & X’ of the systems. Some readers may be sceptical about the dynamics of the motion of
the balls etc, but we are not interested in it as the observer will only observe Part A.
In Fig A the part X of the diagram describes a simple container containing a liquid. As
it is clear from the previous consideration the effect of part Y on part X is to produce some
disturbance in the liquid and the motion of the surface of the liquid,inside the container. But
the observer being unaware of the part B of the apparatus has to interpret the motion. One
of the possible explanation of the motion may be given by the assumption of an existence of a
density function ρ(x, y, z)inside the liquid. To describe a definite model to explain the effective
motion of the liquid it may be assumed a non uniform distribution of particles along the length
of the enclosure as to say
ρ(x, y, z) = 1
z
This implies that there are large number of the particles at the surface of liquid which
continually decrease as one goes along the liquid upwards till the liquid surface. So the large
number of particles at the bottom may influence some pressure and thereby force on the next
layer of particles which continually goes on to produce an appreciable motion of the liquid
surface.
So essentially the success of the model essentially depends on a suitable choice of the density
function which will correctly describe the motion of the surface of the liquid as has been ob-
served.
In Fig B Part X’ of the diagram denotes again a simple box which has a charged particle
placed on the floor of the box. That the particle is a charged one has been tested previously in a
lab by suitable electrical experiments(say). Now again as in the previous case the Part Y of the
figure will influence the Part X’ and will in turn effect the motion of the charged particle. So
as it is clear by now that the observer will have to describe the motion of the charged particle.,
though the observer is absolutely unaware of Part Y. The charged particle may be undergoing
arbitrary motions and the observer accounts for it by ascribing an existence of an electric field
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E(x, y, z) inside the container. The correct description of the charged particle will eventually
depend on the suitable choice of the electric field.
So now the two gedanken experiments give rise to some interesting consequences. First of all
it is not necessary that the observed world may match with the real world. The most important
fact related to this is that a single real world may give rise to many observable situations and
thereby to many descriptions of the observable world. and the same reality. Now at this stage
a question may be asked that so what the big deal is this, as in any case we cannot observe the
real world and may be cannot really aspire to know about it why not rename the observable
world as the real one. Well as far naming is concerned it may not be a big problem, but can
we sure whether it will not induce any effects on the observable world, perhaps not.This is the
line of attack we will take up in the next section where we argue that the real world though
absolutely unobservable and inaccessible yet may be crucial as far development of physical
theories and thereby knowledge is concerned. We will be giving an example to illucidate our
point.
5 A proposed model for the mechanism of generating
physical theories:
The basic aim of this section is not the the content of knowledge or it’s one of the manifestations,
physical theories. On the contrary we are interested in finding whether there are any schemes
about which we infer conclusions or to be specific enough to go on to discover physical theories,
mathematical theorems etc. The Godel Turing argument analysed in Section 2 clearly shows
that computational processes may be insufficient to bear all fruits. Penrose claims that there
may be noncomputational [21] [22] [23]process linked with brain activities. The model we
want to describe here though satisfies the Godel’s incompleteness theorem, yet we invoke some
different methods which do not need that the brain activities need to be noncomputational
in principle. the arguments are furthur enhanced by the Gedanken experiment performed in
Section 4.
So in order to describe the model, the observed world is essentially demarcated from the
real world which is completely inaccesible to the observer. The only role the real world has is in
producing observable effects to the observed world as we have seen in the thought experiment
described in section 4.
The information content corresponding to the observed world is encaspulated in the seman-
tics, mathematical tools, symbols and logical & semantic connectives. [24]
Let a be the set of alphabets and the rule of syntax, m corresponds to the sets of mathematical
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symbols and the rules of inference, q denotes the set of logical and semantic connectives.
Now,
L = {s(l)|l ∈ a, s(l) ≡ statements and propositions oflinguistics} (1)
M = {s(m)|m ∈ m, s(m) ≡ statements and propositions of mathematics} (2)
C = {s(cl, cm)|cl, cm ∈ q, s(cl, cm) ≡ statements of the connectives} (3)
So as we can all understand that the full information of the observable world is encoded
in the above constructed sets. To be more specific any information regarding the observable
world is nothing but a statement or proposition obeying the formal rules of mathematics and
linguistics.
So if we construct the direct product of sets [25]
L
⊗
M
⊗
C
we can be assured that any statement regarding the observable world is contained as a true
statement p(z) contained in a set
P = {p(z)|z ∈ L
⊗
M
⊗
C s.t p(z) is true}
So the maximum information accessible to any observer is encoded in the set P. It is the
set of objects which are knowable to any observer. Hence in order to discuss the discovery of
physical theories it is quite necessary to study the possible evolutions of the set . How can
such a possible evolution be achieved is a dynamical question also completely dependent on
the structures of the set P, which at this stage is pretty difficult to answer. We on the other
hand will be mainly concerned with the mechanical model of what may be the possible sorts
of evolution.
Borrowing our notations from Dirac’s notation. we claim that the set P corresponding to
the observable world is associated a state |P〉. The state |P〉 encodes the information about
the observed world. Now as we have got a glimpse of the basic scheme we now state our basic
propositions.
Proposition 1:
The observed states is the effect of the interaction between the observer (brain states) [26]and
the real world states. The interaction is in particular a form of entanglement,in a sense that
the real world states may influence the observer (brain) states and therefore correlated .6
6For notational convenience we term the Observer + apparatus as the brain states. The symbolism should
not be misunderstood with the connotation of associated consciousness.
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So symbolically,
|P〉 ≡
∑
k ck|Bk〉|Rk〉
7
Proposition 2:
Corresponding to i ∈ I where I is an indexing set,there exists a class of states |Bi〉|Ri〉 which
correspond to different class of observed states given by |Pλ〉 where λ ∈ ∆ where ∆ is a different
indexing set.
Proposition 3:
Reaching Conclusions from a given state |Pi〉 will be induced by at most two inequivalent
processes , which are marked as X and O. The process X denotes a computational process
and the process O which is not computational. At this stage the terms computational and non
computational are defined ostensively.
Proposition 4:
The brain states|B〉 are associated to the observer and do correspond to the brain functions
which is essentially the seat for undergoing computational processes.
Now to describe the evolution of the state |Pλ〉 = |Bi〉|Ri〉 to a completely different non
trivial state |P˜λ〉 = |B˜i〉|R˜i〉 is denoted schematically by
|Pλ〉
X&O
−→ |P˜λ〉
Proposition 5:
The Gedanken experiment which we performed gives rise to another conclusion which we
state as a proposition. Same set of real world states may give rise to different observable states
for the same brain states. Different sets of real world states may also correspond to different
observed states for the same set of brain states.
Symbolically,
|Pλ〉 = |Bi〉|Ri〉 |P
′
λ〉 = |Bi〉|R
′
i〉
This is a consequence of the third proposition which entails that any conclusion whatsoever
from a definite information state corresponding to the observed world evolves into any other
7For simplicity of notations from now onwards we don’t include the sum though we represent an entangled
state.
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information state by 2 fundamental inequivalent processes. At this point it is imperative to
attend to the basic problem of measurement as it is in quantum mechanics.As it is clear that
we have associated the basic knowledge about the observed world as a class of entangled infor-
mation states. So essentially any gain in information is but an evolution of the associated state.
Though we will propose a model for the evolution but the nature is not yet clear. If it is a state
collapse then the role of observer is pretty ambiguous.For some alternative proposals London
& Bauer [27] has an interesting suggestion,though they unlike us do not have a construction
of the real world states. According to their proposals that states of the observer satisfy vec-
torial relations required by ordinary quantum mechanics,but do not evolve temporally in the
quantum mechanical sense.Though in a sense it is a strange proposal,extending quantum the-
ory somewhat into the domain of psychology,nevertheless a consistent theory.In other words
the proposal claims an inclusion of the observer to be somewhat essential for the state vector
collapse.
Another pretty different but interesting idea stems from Von Neumann [28]
the so-called principle of psycho-physical parallelism -that it must be possible so
to describe the extra physical process of the subjective perception as it were in reality
in the physical world-i.e, to assign to its parts equivalent processes in the objective
environment,in physical space.
In accordance with this argument whenever there is a measurement, the world is divided
into two parts, one part comprising the system being observed and the other the observer. The
boundary between these parts is arbitrary. According to Von Neumann if the formalism of
quantum mechanics is applied to the observed part of the world, the predictions obtained are
independent of the location of the boundary.
At present we will not analyze the above issues any furthur. Our point has been to state
how to model an observer in our context and we argue that there may be various alternative
approaches which may be undertaken but the issue is very well unsettled at present.
Equipped with these propositions let us now try to find out in detail how to obtain con-
clusions from a set of premises. As it is obvious the set of premises do form a definite state
obtained from the set P.
Any conclusion is thereby defined to be the implementation of a series of states
|Pλ〉−→|P˜
1
λ〉−→|P˜
2
λ〉−→ · · ·
Now say we start with an information which corresponds to an observed state
|Pλ〉 = |Bi〉|Ri〉
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By Proposition 4,the |Bi〉 states transform by the computational process X through a series
(the accessible states)
|Bi〉
X
−→ |B
′
i〉
This may in turn give rise to a new observed state
|P
′
λ〉 = |B
′
i〉|Ri〉
So preceding as above we may get a series of states
|Pλ〉−→|P
1
λ〉−→|P
2
λ〉−→ · · · |P
n
λ〉
which are connected with each other by the transformation of the brain states via a com-
putational process.
At this stage we link th other process which is fundamentally different from the compu-
tational one in a sense that they are nonlocal and stochastic in nature and denote a jump of
the states which may not be determined. In this context it will be interesting to point out
the question of the quantum jumps has been previously being considered by [29].The process
is marked by the special property that the real world states may influence the brain states to
deliver a jump.
|Pλ〉 ≡ |Bi〉|Ri〉
X
−→ |B
′
i〉|Ri〉−→|B
′
i〉|R
′
i〉
The last step of the transformation has been in accordance with the Fifth Proposition which
entails that there exists states for the same brain states but different real world states.
The next process which we show is another assumption on the basis of Proposition 3 where
we give a concrete scheme for non-computational process.
|Bi〉|R
′
i〉
O
−→ |B¨
o
i 〉|R
′
i〉
Thereby the |B¨
o
i 〉 are not accessible from the |Bi〉 state by any computational process.
So now we conclude that any sort of nontrivial conclusions is being generated by the following
sequence
|Pλ〉 ≡ |Bi〉|Ri〉
X
→ |B1i 〉|Ri〉
X
→ |B2i 〉|Ri〉 ≡ |B
2
i 〉|R
′
i〉
O
→ |B¨i〉|R
′
i〉
X
→ |B¨
1
i 〉|R
′
i〉→|B¨
1
i 〉|R
′′
i 〉
So the state |B¨
1
i 〉|R
′′
i 〉 can be identified with the non trivial final state |P¨λ〉. The states are
generated by a series of computational & non-computational processes. We propose that for
gaining information which is not encoded in the initial state the computational processes are
not enough, though we have assumed that he brain states are connected by those only.
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Now we give an example from computational geometry [30]illustrating our scheme. We took
this particular example in particular to show that though we may be inclined to think that this
is wholly a computational problem but essentially we show here that how can our scheme may
be implemented in this case and this in turn also shows how noncomputational processes play
pivotal role in the theory of inferences.
In essence computational geometry is the study of designing and analysis of algorithms
in the context of problems from geometry.In view of the above analysis we would like to see
how the above mechanism of generating conclusions translate to the case of closest pair problem.
The Premise:
Let there are given points in a plane. What are conclusions which we can reach from these set
of data.
The Analysis:
We will be mainly concerned with the simplest solution for the above problem in accordance
with the model proposed by us.
As the premise consists of given points on a plane it is the concerned observed state |Pλ〉.
As we have already discussed this state is an entangled state of the corresponding real world
and brain states. So,
|Pλ〉 =
∑
i ci|Bi〉|Ri〉
8
So qualitatively the points are designated as an entangled state corresponding to some real
world which cannot be determined and the brain world states.
So to get some non trivial conclusions from the initial state |Pλ〉 we get at first the following
sequence.
|Pλ〉 ≡ |Bi〉|Ri〉
O
→ |B¨i〉|R
′
i〉 ≡ |Pλ〉
So here a non computational process which transforms the brain state |Bi〉 into a brain state
|B¨i〉 which is the state which registers the concept of a distance between the points in the plane
or may be also the number of points in the plane. It should be noted here that this is already
a complex process which has other parameters too. In order to give a simplified model for the
aforesaid scheme we keep the complexities to a minimum. So in brief the noncomputational
process gives rise to a state which may now effectively give rise to some non trivial conclusions
which are not encoded in the initial state which may be described as follows.
The transformed brain state |B¨i〉 in this case of the simplified model is the seat for gener-
ating nontrivial computational processes which we may depict as
8We made an exception here with respect to our earlier remarks. Again we state that for simplicity from
now onwards we don’t include the sum though we represent an entangled state.
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|Pλ〉 ≡ |B¨i〉|R
′
i〉
X
=⇒ |P
′
λ〉
So essentially as with the closest pair problem,state which has been obtained by a noncom-
putational process now gives rise to a state which via some computational processes only give
rise to some entangled real and brain world states which corresponds to some observed state.
The computational process as it can be guessed can be generated by an algorithm. We are not
interested here to analyze the efficiency of the algorithm
6 Conclusion
So as a matter of fact the main objective of this paper has been to go through in detail
the process by which we may make definite conclusions which has been speculative and we
proposed a model as regards to it. The accuracy of the model will nevertheless be dependent
on correct theories of computation, quantum aspects and neural networks. The theory of
cognitive neuroscience [31]and computational neurobiology [32]will be immensely helpful in
deciphering neural network models which may be in turn be focused to predict a model for
cognitive function. The problem which we feel here is that in computational correlates of brain
function and associated aspects models may be constructed at various stages which may be
consistent with each other. For example the Hopfield [33]neural network model along with back
propagation and classical theory of computation may be used to give rise a specific model for
perception. In the context of information-processing approaches mental or cognitive events are
abstract and cannot be reduced to neurological phenomena. Perception, memory learning etc
may be mapped in terms of their functions and processes without concern for their neurological
causes. Though at this point it will be worthwhile to ask whether neural activities of brain can
be modeled by quantum mechanics but some recent arguments more or less tries to answer the
scepticism in the negative [34][35][36][37] .As far as the computational viewpoint is concerned a
logical theory machine [38]has been constructed for the first mathematical proof conducted by a
machine,there are also claims of General Problem Solver to study and simulate human problem
solving. On the extreme of these viewpoints there has been connectionist [39]approaches which
has close ties to the neurological perspective that the mind is powered by the brain where
a serial processing of information sequential, or in parallel, processes in the reception and
transformation of information signals. In this context it will be interesting to remark at this
stage that for a specific model of memory we believe that there exists some optimal physical
process, though we feel it will be quite remarkable if something like Grover’s algorithm [40] has
any role to play there. We hope to construct a category based model of perception and thought
in our next endeavor.
The model we have proposed here essentially underpinnes a noncomputational process which
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we at this stage have defined ostensively. But we believe that some appropriate neurobiological
process should be accounted for that. As a remark it is felt that the sacred laws of physics which
govern nature may not be universal but relative to the cognitive system. As an example two
different neural models may give rise to completely different perception and modes of inference
processing on account which they both may differ in their corresponding world views.
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